Patents, R&D subsidies, and endogenous market structure in a schumpeterian economy by Chu, Angus C et al.
Patents, R&D Subsidies and Endogenous Market
Structure in a Schumpeterian Economy
Angus C. Chu, University of Liverpool
Yuichi Furukawa, Chukyo University
Lei Ji, OFCE Sciences-Po and SKEMA Business School
October 2014
Abstract
This study explores the di¤erent implications of patent breadth and R&D subsidies
on economic growth and endogenous market structure in a Schumpeterian growth
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1 Introduction
What are the di¤erent implications of patent breadth and R&D subsidies on economic growth
and market structure? To explore this question, we consider a second-generation R&D-based
growth model, pioneered by Peretto (1998), Young (1998), Howitt (1999) and Segerstrom
(2000). To our knowledge, this is the rst study that analyzes patent breadth in a second-
generation R&D-based growth model.1 The model features two dimensions of technological
progress. In the vertical dimension, rms improve the quality of existing products. In
the horizontal dimension, rms invent new products. In this Schumpeterian growth model
with endogenous market structure (EMS) measured by the equilibrium number of rms, we
nd some interesting di¤erences between patent breadth and R&D subsidies. At the rst
glance, these two policy instruments should have similar e¤ects on innovation and economic
growth. Patent breadth improves incentives for innovation by increasing the private return
to R&D investment, whereas R&D subsidies improve incentives for innovation by reducing
the private cost of R&D investment. Previous studies, such as Grossman and Helpman
(1991), Segerstrom (1998), Li (2001), Zeng and Zhang (2007) and Iwaisako and Futagami
(2013), often nd that these two policy instruments have positive e¤ects on innovation in
R&D-based growth models. However, in a Schumpeterian growth model with EMS, we nd
that patent breadth and R&D subsidies have drastically di¤erent implications on economic
growth and market structure. Specically, when the number of rms is xed in the short
run, patent breadth and R&D subsidies both have positive e¤ects on economic growth as in
previous studies. Interestingly, when market structure adjusts endogenously in the long run,
patent breadth expands the number of rms but decreases economic growth, whereas R&D
subsidies increase economic growth but reduce the number of rms.
Intuitively, R&D subsidies decrease the cost of R&D investment and improve incentives
for R&D; therefore, a higher rate of R&D subsidies increases economic growth in the short
run and in the long run. As for an increase in patent breadth, it raises the prot margin of
monopolistic rms and provides more incentives for R&D in the short run. In the long run, it
encourages the entry of new rms, which in turn reduces the market size of each rm. Given
that the market size of a rm determines its incentives for innovation in the second-generation
R&D-based growth model,2 a larger patent breadth decreases long-run economic growth.
These contrasting long-run implications of patent breadth and R&D subsidies suggest that
R&D subsidy is perhaps a more suitable policy instrument than patent breadth for the
purpose of stimulating long-run economic growth. The negative e¤ect of patent protection
on innovation is consistent with the evidence discussed in Ja¤e and Lerner (2004), Bessen and
Meurer (2008) and Boldrin and Levine (2008). As for the positive e¤ect of R&D subsidies
on innovation, it is also consistent with empirical evidence; see for example, Hall and Van
Reenen (2000) for a survey of empirical studies.
This study relates to the literature on R&D-driven economic growth; see Romer (1990),
Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) for
1See also Cozzi and Spinesi (2006) for an analysis of an alternative patent policy instrument, namely
intellectual appropriability, in the second-generation model in Howitt (1999).
2Laincz and Peretto (2006) provide empirical evidence for a positive relationship between average rm
size and economic growth. See also Ha and Howitt (2007), Madsen (2008), Madsen et al. (2010) and Ang and
Madsen (2011) for other empirical studies that support the second-generation R&D-based growth model.
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seminal studies. Subsequent studies in this literature often apply variants of the R&D-based
growth model to analyze the e¤ects of policy instruments, such as R&D subsidies and patent
breadth, on economic growth and innovation; see for example, Segerstrom (1998, 2000), Li
(2001), Goh and Olivier (2002), Lin (2002), Impullitti (2007, 2010), Zeng and Zhang (2007),
Chu (2011), Chu and Furukawa (2011) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013).3 However, these
studies do not analyze the e¤ects of patent policy on market structure.4 Therefore, the
present study contributes to the literature with a novel analysis of patent breadth in a Schum-
peterian growth model in which market structure is endogenous. Furthermore, we compare
the e¤ects of patent breadth and R&D subsidies and nd that in a Schumpeterian growth
model with EMS, the long-run e¤ects of patent breadth and R&D subsidies are drastically
di¤erent suggesting the importance of taking into consideration the endogeneity of market
structure when performing policy analysis in R&D-based growth models. ODonoghue and
Zweimuller (2004), Horii and Iwaisako (2007), Furukawa (2007, 2010), Chu (2009), Chu et al.
(2012), Chu and Pan (2013) and Yang (2014) also nd that increasing the strength of other
patent policy levers, such as blocking patents and patentability requirement, could have neg-
ative e¤ects on economic growth. Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) consider the interesting case
of state-dependent patent length and show that full patent protection does not maximize
economic growth. The present study di¤ers from these previous studies that mostly focus
on the long-run e¤ects of patent policy and contributes to the literature by showing that
EMS leads to di¤erent short-run and long-run implications of patent protection on economic
growth. Cozzi and Galli (2014) simulate the transitional e¤ects of increasing the strength of
basic research patents and nd that it has di¤erent e¤ects on economic growth at di¤erent
time horizons. Our study complements their interesting analysis by exploring the e¤ects of
patent policy via an alternative mechanism, namely EMS, and by analytically showing the
opposite short-run and long-run e¤ects of patent breadth.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Schumpeterian growth
model with EMS. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects of patent breadth and R&D subsidies. Section
4 concludes.
2 A Schumpeterian growth model with EMS
In summary, the growth-theoretic framework is based on the Schumpeterian model with in-
house R&D and EMS in Peretto (2007, 2011). In this model, labor is used as a factor input
for the production of nal goods. Final goods are either consumed by the household or used
as a factor input for R&D, entry and the production of intermediate goods. We incorporate
patent breadth into the model and analyze its di¤erent implications from R&D subsidies on
economic growth and market structure. In our analysis, we provide a complete closed-form
solution for the balanced growth path and transition dynamics.
3For studies that explore the e¤ects of patent length on economic growth, see for example Iwaisako and
Futagami (2003), Futagami and Iwaisako (2007), Lin (2014) and Zeng et al. (2014).
4See Peretto (1996, 1999) for seminal studies in the R&D-based growth model with EMS and Etro (2012)
for an excellent textbook treatment of this topic.
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2.1 Household
In the economy, the population size is normalized to unity, and there is a representative
household who has the following lifetime utility function:
U =
1Z
0
e t lnCtdt, (1)
where Ct denotes consumption of nal goods (numeraire) at time t. The parameter  > 0
determines the rate of subjective discounting. The household maximizes (1) subject to the
following asset-accumulation equation:
_At = rtAt + (1  )wtL  Ct. (2)
At is the real value of assets owned by the household, and rt is the real interest rate. The
household has a labor endowment of L units and supplies them inelastically to earn a real
wage rate wt. The household also pays a wage-income tax wtL to the government. From
standard dynamic optimization, the familiar Euler equation is
_Ct
Ct
= rt   . (3)
2.2 Final goods
We follow Aghion and Howitt (2005, 2008) and Peretto (2007, 2011) to assume that nal
goods Yt are produced by competitive rms using the following production function:5
Yt =
Z Nt
0
Xt (i)[Z

t (i)Z
1 
t L=Nt]
1 di, (4)
where f; g 2 (0; 1) and Xt(i) denotes intermediate goods i 2 [0; Nt]. The productivity
of intermediate good Xt(i) depends on its quality Zt(i) and also on the average quality
Zt  1Nt
R Nt
0
Zt(i)di of all intermediate goods capturing R&D spillovers. The degree of
technology spillovers is determined by 1   . From prot maximization, the equilibrium
wage rate is determined by
wt = (1  )Yt=L, (5)
and the conditional demand function for Xt(i) is
Xt(i) =


pt(i)
1=(1 )
Zt (i)Z
1 
t L=Nt, (6)
where pt(i) is the price ofXt(i) and the price of Yt is normalized to unity. Perfect competition
implies that nal goods producers pay Yt =
R Nt
0
pt(i)Xt(i)di to intermediate goods rms.
5Peretto (2007, 2011) consider a slightly di¤erent production function that replaces L=Nt by lt(i), which
denotes labor that uses intermediate goods Xt(i). Given that lt(i) = L=Nt in equilibrium, we follow Aghion
and Howitt (2005, 2008) to consider the specication with L=Nt, which has the advantage of being general-
izable. Peretto (2013) considers a more general specication with L=Nt , where  2 (0; 1) inversely measures
the social return to varieties. In Section 3.1, we discuss the robustness of our main results under this general
specication.
4
2.3 Intermediate goods and in-house R&D
Existing intermediate goods rms produce di¤erentiated goods with a technology that re-
quires one unit of nal goods to produce one unit of intermediate goods Xt(i). Following
Peretto (2011), we assume that the rm in industry i incurs Zt units of nal goods as a xed
operating cost, where Zt is aggregate technology as dened above. This specication implies
that managing facilities are more expensive to operate in a technologically more advanced
economy. To improve the quality of its products, the rm invests Rt(i) units of nal goods
in R&D. The innovation process is
_Zt(i) = Rt(i). (7)
The value of the monopolistic rm in industry i is
Vt(i) =
Z 1
t
exp

 
Z u
t
rvdv

u(i)du. (8)
The dividend ow t(i) at time t is
t(i) = [pt(i)  1]Xt(i)  Zt   (1  s)Rt(i), (9)
where the parameter s 2 (0; 1) is the rate of R&D subsidies. The monopolistic rmmaximizes
(8) subject to (6) and (7). The current-value Hamiltonian for this optimization problem is
Ht(i) = t(i) + t(i) _Zt(i). (10)
We solve this optimization problem in the Appendix and nd that the unconstrained prot-
maximizing markup ratio is 1=. To analyze the e¤ects of patent breadth, we impose an
upper bound  > 1 on the markup ratio.6 Therefore, the equilibrium price becomes
pt(i) = min f; 1=g . (11)
For the rest of this study, we assume that  < 1=. In this case, a larger patent breadth
 leads to a higher markup, and this implication is consistent with Gilbert and Shapiros
(1990) seminal insight on breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise price. Finally,
Lemma 1 shows that the return to in-house R&D is increasing in the market size of each
rm measured by employment per variety L=Nt.
Lemma 1 The return to in-house R&D is given by
rt =

1  s
"
(  1)



1=(1 )
L
Nt
#
. (12)
Proof. See the Appendix.
6Intuitively, the presence of monopolistic prots attracts potential imitators. However, stronger patent
protection increases the production cost of imitative products and allows monopolistic rms to charge a
higher markup without losing market share to these potential imitators; see also Li (2001), Goh and Olivier
(2002), Chu (2011), Chu and Furukawa (2011) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) for a similar formulation.
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2.4 Entrants
A rm that is active at time t must have been born at some earlier date. Following the
standard treatment in the literature, we consider a symmetric equilibrium in which Zt(i) = Zt
for i 2 [0; Nt], by assuming that any new entry at time t has access to the level of aggregate
technology Zt.7 A new rm pays a setup cost Xt(i)F , where F > 0 is a cost parameter, to
set up its operation and introduce a new variety of products to the market.8 We refer to this
process as entry. Suppose entry is positive (i.e., _Nt > 0). The no-arbitrage condition is9
Vt(i) = Xt(i)F . (13)
The familiar Bellman equation implies that the return to entry is
rt =
t
Vt
+
_Vt
Vt
. (14)
2.5 Government
The government chooses an exogenous rate of R&D subsidies s 2 (0; 1). The government
collects tax revenue Tt from the household, and the amount of tax revenue is
Tt = wtL = (1  )Yt, (15)
where  2 (0; 1) is an exogenous tax rate on wage income. The balanced-budget condition is
Tt = Gt + s
Z Nt
0
Rt(i)di, (16)
where Gt is unproductive government consumption that changes endogenously to balance
the scal budget as in Peretto (2007).
2.6 General equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fAt; Ct; Yt; Xt(i); Rt(i)g and prices frt; wt; pt(i); Vt(i)g
such that the following conditions are satised:
 the household maximizes utility taking frt; wtg as given;
7See Peretto (1998, 1999, 2007) for a discussion of the symmetric equilibrium being a reasonable equilib-
rium concept in this class of models.
8The setup cost is proportional to the new rms initial volume of output. This assumption captures
the idea that the setup cost depends on the amount of productive assets required to start production; see
Peretto (2007) for a discussion.
9We follow the standard approach in this class of models to treat entry and exit symmetrically (i.e., the
scrap value of exiting an industry is also Xt(i)F ); therefore, Vt(i) = Xt(i)F always holds. If Vt(i) > Xt(i)F
(Vt(i) < Xt(i)F ), then there would be an innite number of entries (exits).
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 competitive nal goods rms maximize prots taking fpt(i); wtg as given;
 incumbents in the intermediate goods sector choose fpt(i); Rt(i)g to maximize fVt(i)g
taking frtg as given;
 entrants make entry decisions taking fVt(i)g as given;
 the value of all existing monopolistic rms adds up to the value of the households
assets such that At = NtVt; and
 the market-clearing condition of nal goods holds.
The market-clearing condition of nal goods is
Yt = Ct +Nt(Xt + Zt +Rt) + _NtXtF +Gt. (17)
Substituting (6) into (4) and imposing symmetry yield the aggregate production function:10
Yt = (=)
=(1 ) ZtL, (18)
which also uses markup pricing pt(i) = .
We now analyze the dynamics of the economy. In the Appendix, we show that the
consumption-output ratio Ct=Yt jumps to a unique and stable steady-state value. This
equilibrium property simplies the analysis of transition dynamics.
Lemma 2 The consumption-output ratio jumps to a unique and stable steady-state value:
(C=Y ) = (1  )(1  ) + F

. (19)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Equations (18) and (19) imply that for any given  and  ,
_Zt
Zt
=
_Yt
Yt
=
_Ct
Ct
= rt   , (20)
where the last equality uses the Euler equation in (3). Combining (12) and (20), we derive
the equilibrium growth rate given by
gt 
_Zt
Zt
= max
(

1  s
"
(  1)



1=(1 )
L
Nt
#
  ; 0
)
, (21)
10As discussed in footnote 4, introducing a social return to varieties would not change our results.
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which is increasing in the market size of each rm measured by employment per variety
L=Nt.11 From (21), the growth rate gt is strictly positive if and only if
Nt < N  (  1) (=)
1=(1 ) L
(1  s) .
Intuitively, innovation requires each rms market size to be large enough so that it is prof-
itable for rms to do in-house R&D. A su¢ cient market size requires the number of rms to
be below a critical level N . If Nt > N , then there are too many rms diluting the return to
R&D. As a result, rms do not invest in R&D, and the growth rate of vertical innovation is
zero. In the Appendix, we provide the derivations of the dynamics of Nt, which is a state
variable.
Lemma 3 The dynamics of Nt is determined by a one-dimensional di¤erential equation:12
_Nt
Nt
=
8<:
 1
F
 
h
+ (1  s) _Zt
Zt
i
Nt=L
(=)1=(1 )F
   if Nt < N
 1
F
   Nt=L
(=)1=(1 )F
   if Nt > N
9=; . (22)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The di¤erential equation in (22) shows that given any initial value, Nt gradually converges
to its steady-state value denoted as N.13 On the transition path, the number of rms
determines each rms market size L=Nt and the equilibrium growth rate gt according to
(21). When Nt evolves toward the steady state, gt also gradually converges to its steady-
state value g. The following proposition derives the steady-state values fN; gg.
Proposition 1 Under the parameter restrictions  < min f=(1  s); (1  )(  1)=Fg,14
the dynamics of Nt is globally stable and Nt gradually converges to a unique positive steady-
state value. The steady-state values fN; gg are given by
N(
+
; s
 
) =

(1  )   1
1=(1 )
  F
1=(1 )

1=(1 )
  (1  s)L > 0, (23)
g(
 
; s
+
) =
(  1)
(1  )(  1)  F


1  s   

   > 0. (24)
Proof. See the Appendix.
11Considering data on employment, R&D personnel, and the number of establishments in the US for the
period from 1964 to 2001, Laincz and Peretto (2006) provide empirical evidence that is consistent with the
theoretical prediction from this class of models that economic growth is increasing in average rm size.
12It is useful to note that _Zt=Zt is a function of Nt given by (21).
13In this model, we have assumed zero population growth, so that Nt converges to a steady state. If we
assume positive population growth, it would be the number of rms per capita that converges to a steady
state instead, and our main results would be unchanged.
14These parameter restrictions would depend on a larger set of parameters if we parameterize R&D pro-
ductivity in (7) and the productivity in producing intermediate goods from nal goods. For simplicity, we
have implicitly normalized these productivity parameters to unity.
8
3 Patent breadth versus R&D subsidies
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of patent breadth and R&D subsidies. In Section 3.1,
we analyze the e¤ects of patent breadth on the number of rms, the market size of each rm
and economic growth. In Section 3.2, we analyze the e¤ects of R&D subsidies.
3.1 E¤ects of patent breadth
In this subsection, we analyze the e¤ects of patent breadth. Equation (21) shows that the
initial impact of a larger patent breadth  on the equilibrium growth rate gt is positive be-
cause Nt is xed in the short run. This is the standard positive prot-margin e¤ect, captured
by (   1)=1=(1 ) in (21), of patent breadth on monopolistic prots and innovation as in
previous studies, such as Li (2001), Chu (2011), Chu and Furukawa (2011) and Iwaisako and
Futagami (2013). However, in the long run, market structure is endogenous and the number
of rms adjusts. In particular, the higher prot margin attracts the entry of rms, which
in turn reduces each rms market size L=Nt and decreases incentives for innovation. This
negative entry e¤ect dominates the positive prot-margin e¤ect such that the steady-state
equilibrium growth rate g becomes lower than the original steady-state level. Therefore,
allowing for the endogeneity of market structure, the present study extends previous stud-
ies in the literature by demonstrating the opposite short-run and long-run e¤ects of patent
breadth on economic growth. Proposition 2 summarizes the results. Figures 1 and 2 plot
the transition paths of fgt; Ntg when  increases at time t.
Proposition 2 The initial e¤ect of a larger patent breadth on economic growth is positive
as a result of increased monopolistic prots. In the long run, higher prot margin attracts the
entry of rms and reduces the market size of each rm. The smaller market size decreases
incentives for innovation and the steady-state growth rate.
Proof. Equation (21) shows that for a given Nt, @gt=@ > 0. Equations (23) and (24) show
that @N=@ > 0 and @g=@ < 0.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here]
Proposition 2 shows that the long-run e¤ect of patent breadth is monotonically negative.
This result is based on the parameter restriction in Proposition 1 that ensures the global
stability of Nt, and this parameter restriction can be reexpressed as
 > 1 +
F
1    .
Within this parameter space  > , we nd that a larger patent breadth  increases the
number of rms in the long run, which in turn decreases the market size of each rm (i.e.,
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L=N) and long-run growth. In our model, increasing patent breadth triggers two compe-
tition e¤ects. First, increasing patent breadth allows a rm to charge a higher markup by
preventing other rms from imitating its product. Second, increasing patent breadth en-
courages more rms to enter the market with new products. If we refer to the rst e¤ect as
vertical competition and the second e¤ect as horizontal competition, then an alternative way
to describe our result would be that increasing patent breadth weakens vertical competition
but strengthens horizontal competition. It is this strengthening of horizontal competition
that gives rise to the negative entry e¤ect of patent breadth in our analysis.15
In our model, the negative entry e¤ect of patent breadth dominates the positive prot-
margin e¤ect. In an alternative model, it may be the case that the relative magnitude
of these two e¤ects is di¤erent. Indeed, we nd that the relative magnitude of the entry
and prot-margin e¤ects depends on the specication of the entry cost. In this study, we
have followed Peretto (2007) to assume an entry cost given by XtF , which is proportional to
Zt=Nt in equilibrium. It is useful to recall that N is increasing in . Therefore, by attracting
entry, a larger patent breadth decreases each rms output Xt and the cost of entry, which
in turn amplies the magnitude of the negative entry e¤ect on long-run growth. Suppose
we consider an alternative entry cost function ZtF . In this case, we nd that the negative
entry e¤ect and the positive prot-margin e¤ect exactly cancel each other leaving an overall
neutral e¤ect of patent breadth on long-run growth.16 However, we nd that an entry cost
that depends on the rms initial output volume Xt to be a more reasonable specication.
Finally, as mentioned in footnote 5, our result is robust to a more general production
function given by
Yt =
Z Nt
0
Xt (i)[Z

t (i)Z
1 
t L=N

t ]
1 di, (4a)
where  2 (0; 1) inversely measures the social benet of variety. Then, the aggregate pro-
duction function in (18) becomes
Yt = (=)
=(1 ) ZtN1 t L, (18a)
where Nt contributes to the production of Yt. In this case, patent breadth continues to
have a negative e¤ect on long-run growth,17 because even under a positive social return to
varieties, increasing the number of varieties raises the level of output but not the long-run
growth rate.18
3.2 E¤ects of R&D subsidies
In this subsection, we analyze the e¤ects of R&D subsidies. Equation (21) shows that the
initial impact of a higher rate of R&D subsidies s on the equilibrium growth rate gt is positive
15See also Aghion et al. (2005, 2009) on the theoretical and empirical relationship between rm entry,
competition and economic growth.
16Derivations available upon request.
17Derivations available upon request.
18This is true even if Nt increases over time in the presence of population growth. In the second-generation
model, the long-run growth rate of Nt is determined by the exogenous population growth rate.
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givenNt. On the transition path, the higher rate of R&D subsidies makes in-house R&Dmore
attractive relative to entry. As a result, resources reallocate from entry to in-house R&D,
and the number of rms decreases. The smaller number of rms increases each rms market
size, which further improves incentives for in-house R&D. This positive market-size e¤ect
strengthens the initial positive e¤ect of R&D subsidies such that the steady-state equilibrium
growth rate g increases further above the initial level. Therefore, the endogeneity of market
structure amplies the positive e¤ects of R&D subsidies on economic growth. Peretto (1998)
and Segerstrom (2000) also analyze the e¤ects of R&D subsidies in a second-generation
Schumpeterian growth model. Segerstrom (2000) nds that R&D subsidies can have either
a positive or negative e¤ect on economic growth, and this interesting result is driven by
the tradeo¤ between quality improvement and variety expansion on economic growth. In
contrast, economic growth is solely based on quality improvement in the present study and
in Peretto (1998), who also nds a positive e¤ect of R&D subsidies on economic growth.
Peretto and Connolly (2007) provide a theoretical justication that quality improvement is
the only plausible engine of economic growth in the long run. Proposition 3 summarizes the
results. Figures 3 and 4 plot the transition paths of fgt; Ntg when s increases at time t.
Proposition 3 The initial e¤ect of a higher rate of R&D subsidies on economic growth is
positive. In the long run, rms exit the market, and the market size of each rm increases.
The larger market size further strengthens incentives for innovation and increases the steady-
state growth rate.
Proof. Equation (21) shows that for a given Nt, @gt=@s > 0. Equations (23) and (24) show
that @N=@s < 0 and @g=@s > 0.
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 here]
We now consider an extension of the baseline model by allowing for a subsidy to entry
denoted by e 2 (0; 1). In this case, the entry condition in (13) becomes
Vt(i) = (1  e)Xt(i)F . (25)
Furthermore, the governments balanced-budget condition is modied to
Tt = Gt + s
Z Nt
0
Rt(i)di+ e _NtXtF . (26)
The rest of the model is the same as before. Following the same procedures as before,19 we
derive the same equilibrium growth rate in (21) and the steady-state equilibrium number of
varieties given by
N(e
+
) =

(1  )   1
1=(1 )
  (1  e)F
1=(1 )

1=(1 )
  (1  s)L > 0, (27)
19Derivations are available upon request.
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which is naturally increasing in the entry subsidy rate e. Given that the equilibrium growth
rate is given by (21) as before and does not directly depend on e, an increase in entry subsidies
does not a¤ect economic growth initially. However, given that entry subsidies attract the
entry of rms and reduce the market size of each rm, the equilibrium growth rate gradually
decreases during the transition path and converges to a lower steady-state value.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
If we think of entry as horizontal R&D, then the above analysis implies that horizontal R&D
subsidies can be harmful to economic growth, and this nding is consistent with Peretto
(2007). In other words, in order for R&D subsidies to have a positive e¤ect on economic
growth, policymakers need to design a subsidy (or tax-deduction) system that distinguishes
between di¤erent types of R&D activities, which may be di¢ cult to implement in practice.
In the rest of this subsection, we consider symmetric R&D and entry subsidies by setting
e = s = s. Given that entry subsidies e have no e¤ect on the initial growth rate, an increase
in s must have the same initial positive e¤ect on the growth rate gt as R&D subsidies. As
for the long-run e¤ect on the number of rms, (27) becomes
N(s) =

(1  ) (  1)  (1  s)F
  (1  s)



1=(1 )
L > 0, (28)
which is decreasing (increasing) in s if the following inequality holds:
(1  ) (  1) > (<) F .
If N is decreasing in s, then the long-run e¤ect of s on g must be positive, which we refer to
as case 1 in Figure 6. If N is increasing in s, then a higher rate of subsidies s would have a
negative indirect e¤ect on long-run growth through entry partly o¤setting the positive direct
e¤ect of s on growth. We refer to the case in which the positive direct e¤ect dominates (is
dominated by) the negative indirect e¤ect as case 2 (case 3) in Figure 6.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
Substituting (28) into (21) yields
g =
(  1)
1  s| {z }
direct e¤ect of s
  (1  s)
(1  ) (  1)  (1  s)F| {z }
indirect e¤ect of s
  , (29)
which is increasing in s if and only if the following inequality holds:20
[(1  ) (  1)  (1  s)F ]| {z }
+
  [  (1  s)]| {z }
+
(1  s)F= > 0.
This inequality holds if  is su¢ ciently small. In other words, the overall long-run growth
e¤ect of symmetric R&D and entry subsidies s is generally ambiguous; however, if the
20It can be shown that (1  ) (  1) > F is su¢ cient (but not necessary) for this inequality to hold.
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discount rate  is su¢ ciently small, then an increase in s would have a positive e¤ect on
long-run growth.
To assess whether an increase in s is likely to have a positive long-run e¤ect on economic
growth, we provide a simple calibration exercise here. Our analysis involves the following
parameters f; ; ; s; ; Fg. We follow Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) to set the discount rate
 to a standard value of 0.05. We set the markup ratio  to 1.30 that implies a 30% markup,
which is within the range of empirical estimates summarized in Jones and Williams (2000).
For the degree of spillovers 1 , we consider a value of 0.10. As for the R&D subsidy rate s,
we consider a common value of 15% in developed countries. We consider a range of values for
the entry cost parameter F 2 (0; F ), where the upper bound F  (1  )(  1)=[(1  s)]
is imposed to ensure the global stability of the dynamics of Nt. For each value of F , we
calibrate the value of  by equating the long-run equilibrium growth rate g in (29) to
a standard value of 2%. Table 1 reports the calibrated parameter values and shows the
following implication: for the entire range of F 2 (0; F ), the inequality (1  ) (  1) > F
holds, which is su¢ cient to imply that the equilibrium growth rate g is increasing in R&D
subsidies s as empirical studies tend to nd.
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
   s F  (1  ) ( 1) F
0:05 1:30 0:90 0:15 0:01 0:0490 0:0300 0:0005
0:05 1:30 0:90 0:15 0:10 0:0482 0:0300 0:0048
0:05 1:30 0:90 0:15 0:20 0:0472 0:0300 0:0094
0:05 1:30 0:90 0:15 0:30 0:0463 0:0300 0:0139
0:05 1:30 0:90 0:15 0:40 0:0454 0:0300 0:0181
0:05 1:30 0:90 0:15 0:50 0:0444 0:0300 0:0222
0:05 1:30 0:90 0:15 0:60 0:0435 0:0300 0:0261
0:05 1:30 0:90 0:15 0:70 0:0426 0:0300 0:0298
4 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored the di¤erent implications of two important policy instruments,
patent breadth and R&D subsidies, on economic growth and market structure in a scale-
invariant Schumpeterian growth model with EMS. We nd that when the number of rms is
xed in the short run, patent breadth and R&D subsidies serve to increase economic growth
as in previous studies. However, when market structure adjusts endogenously in the long
run, these two commonly discussed policy instruments have surprisingly opposing e¤ects
on economic growth and market structure. Specically, patent breadth decreases economic
growth but expands the number of rms, whereas R&D subsidies reduce the number of rms
but increase economic growth. These contrasting e¤ects of patent breadth and R&D subsidies
suggest that R&D subsidy is perhaps a more suitable policy instrument than patent breadth
for the purpose of stimulating economic growth. This nding is consistent with evidence
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from empirical studies discussed in the introduction. Given our result that the endogeneity
of market structure leads to di¤erent short-run and long-run e¤ects of patent breadth, it
is important for policymakers to take into consideration the di¤erent implications of patent
policy reform across time horizons.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Substituting (6), (9) and the constraint pt(i)   into (10) yields
Ht(i) = [pt(i) 1]


pt(i)
1=(1 )
Zt (i)Z
1 
t L=Nt Zt (1 s)Rt(i)+t(j)Rt(i)+t(j)[pt(i) ],
(A1)
where t(j) is the multiplier on pt(i)   and t(j) = 0 if pt(i) < . The rst-order conditions
include
@Ht(i)
@pt(i)
= 0, pt(i) = min f; 1=g , (A2)
@Ht(i)
@Rt(i)
= 0, t(i) = 1  s, (A3)
@Ht(i)
@Zt(i)
= [pt(i)  1]


pt(i)
1=(1 )
Z 1t (i)Z
1 
t L=Nt = rtt(i)  _t(i). (A4)
Substituting (A3) and the constrained monopolistic price pt(i) =  < 1= from (A2) into
(A4) yields
rt =

1  s
"
(  1)



1=(1 )
L
Nt
#
, (A5)
where we have also applied the symmetry condition Zt(j) = Zt.
Proof of Lemma 2. Substituting Vt = XtF from (13) into At = NtVt yields
At = NtXtF =
ptNtXt
pt
F =
Yt

F , (A6)
where the last equality uses pt =  and ptXtNt = Yt. Using (A6) and (2), we obtain
_Yt
Yt
=
_At
At
= rt + 
(1  )wtL  Ct
YtF
. (A7)
Substituting the Euler equation and wtL = (1  )Yt into (A7) yields
_Ct
Ct
 
_Yt
Yt
= 
Ct=Yt
F
 


(1  )(1  )
F
+ 

. (A8)
Therefore, the dynamics of Ct=Yt is characterized by saddle-point stability such that Ct=Yt
must jump to its steady-state value in (19).
Proof of Lemma 3. Substituting (9), (13) and pt(i) =  into (14) yields
rt =
  1
F
  Zt + (1  s)Rt
XtF
+
_Xt
Xt
, (A9)
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where we have applied _Vt=Vt = _Xt=Xt. Substituting pt(i) =  into (6) yields
Xt =
Zt
Nt



1=(1 )
L, (A10)
where we have applied Zt(i) = Zt. Substituting (7) and (A10) into (A9) yields
rt =
  1
F
 
"
+ (1  s)
_Zt
Zt
#
Nt=L
(=)1=(1 ) F
+
_Zt
Zt
 
_Nt
Nt
, (A11)
where we have used _Xt=Xt = _Zt=Zt  _Nt=Nt. Substituting (20) into (A11) yields the dynamics
of Nt given by
_Nt
Nt
=
  1
F
 
"
+ (1  s)
_Zt
Zt
#
Nt=L
(=)1=(1 ) F
  . (A12)
Equation (A12) describes the dynamics of Nt when Nt < N . When Nt > N , _Zt=Zt = 0 as
shown in (21).
Proof of Proposition 1. This proof proceeds as follows. First, we prove that under
 < min f=(1  s); (1  )(  1)=Fg, there exists a stable, unique and positive steady-
state value of Nt. Substituting (21) into the rst equation of (22) yields
_Nt
Nt
=
(1  s)  
(=)1=(1 ) F
Nt
L
+
(1  )(  1)
F
  . (A13)
Because Nt is a state variable, the dynamics of Nt is stable if and only if (1   s) < .
Solving _Nt = 0, we obtain the steady-state value of Nt in an economy with positive in-house
R&D given by
N =

(1  )(  1)
F
  

(=)1=(1 ) F
  (1  s) L. (A14)
Given (1 s) < , (A14) shows that N > 0 if and only if  < (1 )( 1)=F . Combining
this inequality with (1  s) < , we have
 < min


1  s;
(1  )(  1)
F

.
Finally, substituting (A14) into (21) yields
gt =
(  1)
(1  )(  1)  F


1  s   

  , (A15)
which is positive if and only if the following inequality holds:
(1  s)F2   (1  s)(  1)+ (  1) > 0,
and this inequality holds if  is su¢ ciently small (or su¢ ciently large).
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